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Abstract. This paper uses a sample of 2,186 credit default swap spreads quoted in the 
European market during the period 2002–2009 to empirically analyze which model – ac-
counting- or market-based – better explains corporate credit risk. We find little difference 
in the explanatory power of these two approaches. Our results indicate that a compre-
hensive model that combines accounting- and market-based variables is the best option 
to explain the credit risk, suggesting that both types of data are complementary. We also 
demonstrate that the explanatory power of credit risk models is particularly strong dur-
ing periods of high uncertainty, such as those experienced in the recent financial crisis. 
Finally, the comprehensive model continues to produce the best results if the credit rating 
is used as the proxy for credit risk; however, accounting variables currently appear to 
have a more important role than market variables in determining corporate credit ratings.
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Introduction
The ability of investors or potential lenders to correctly measure the credit risks of 
companies is an issue that has historically attracted attention in the financial literature. 
This desire to understand the determinants of default risk has grown in strength fol-
lowing the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the 2011 sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe.
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The use of credit risk models has been fully established in the literature since 1966, 
when Beaver published his pioneering work, ‘Financial ratios as predictors of failure’ 
in Journal of Accounting Research, which served as a reference for subsequent inves-
tigations1. This univariate model was followed by a multidimensional-type model that 
integrates all of the relevant variables that contribute to the success or failure of a com-
pany and provides a single diagnosis or overall assessment of their creditworthiness. 
The two best-known multidimensional models of credit risk are Altman’s Z-score model 
(1968) and Ohlson’s O-score model (1980). These models both use information drawn 
from the financial statements of borrowers and are consequently known as accounting-
based models.
More recently, credit risk models have used data from the capital markets in which the 
shares or bonds issued by the companies in question are traded. Among the models 
that use market data, we must highlight those based on Merton (1974), who introduced 
the original model that led to subsequent research on ‘structural models’2. Relying on 
the contingent claims analysis of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974) proposes 
considering the value of the equity as a call option on the value of the assets of the firm 
with a strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt. From this perspective, the 
company will default if its asset value falls below a certain default boundary related 
to the company’s outstanding debt. However, Merton’s (1974) model presents certain 
unrealistic assumptions; in particular, it represents the liability structure of the firm as 
consisting only of a non-callable zero coupon bond and assumes that bankruptcy cannot 
be triggered before maturity. In addition, this model presumes that the absolute priority 
rule always holds at maturity, implying that equity holders can only obtain a positive 
payoff after debt holders are completely reimbursed. 
Many papers have extended Merton’s (1974) original model to incorporate more realis-
tic assumptions. Black and Cox (1976) allow default to occur as soon as a firm’s asset 
value falls below a certain threshold (i.e., at any time). Geske (1977) uses the compound 
option technique to value a corporation’s risky coupon bonds. Anderson and Sundaresan 
(1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) propose a structural model that accounts for 
the possibility of debt renegotiation. A number of other papers have also made more 
sophisticated assumptions, including Leland (1994), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Le-
land and Toft (1996), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Collin-Dufresne and Golstein (2001). 
However, despite the theoretical advances of second-generation structural-form models 
with respect to the original Merton framework, Wei and Guo (1997) find no evidence 
that the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) model produces a better empirical performance 
than the Merton (1974) model in the Eurodollar market.
1 Very early studies on bankruptcy prediction include the work of Fitzpatrick (1932a, b, c), and Smith 
and Winakor (1935).
2 Another market-based approach for measuring credit risk refers to the approaches that are known 
as reduced-form models. The reduced-form approach relies on the assumption that the credit event 
occurs at a completely inaccessible time and consists of modeling the conditional law of this random 
time. Significant studies on this topic include the works of Litterman and Iben (1991), Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995), Duffie and Singleton (1999). 
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Our paper is closely related to recent studies that have investigated whether accounting-
based or market-based approaches are more appropriate for measuring corporate credit 
risk. Accounting models have been criticized for the historic nature of the information 
that they use as inputs and for not accounting for the volatility of a firm’s assets during 
estimations of its risk of default (e.g., Vassalou, Xing 2004)3. However, the inefficien-
cies of capital markets may lead to prediction errors in market-based models. Hillegeist 
et al. (2004) conclude that a measure based on the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing 
model provides significantly more information than either of the two most popular 
accounting-based measures (Z-Score and O-Score). By contrast, Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) conclude that although there is little difference between the predictive abilities 
of the accounting- and market-based approaches, the accounting-based models lead to 
greater bank profitability in conditions involving differential decision error costs and 
competitive pricing regimes. Other studies report mixed results. Demirovic and Thomas 
(2007) find that although distance-to-default is the most significant single variable for 
the measurement of corporate credit risk, market-based models exhibit better perfor-
mance if accounting data are included. Tanthanongsakkun and Treepongkaruna (2008) 
and Das et al. (2009) reach similar conclusions.
The financial literature has used a range of metrics as proxies for credit risk. For instance, 
measures of credit risk that have been used by published studies include the company’s 
financial condition (i.e., bankrupt versus non-bankrupt firms) (e.g., Altman 1968; Ohlson 
1980; Hillegeist et al. 2004; Agarwal, Taffler 2008; Jakubík, Teplý 2011), the credit rat-
ing assigned to a company by a rating agency (e.g., Ang, Patel 1975; Blume et al. 1998; 
Demirovic, Thomas 2007), and the spreads of bonds that have been issued by the firm 
and listed on a secondary market (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001; Longstaff, Rajan 
2006; Wu, Zhang 2008). However, more recently, the empirical literature on credit risk 
has focused on credit default swap (CDS) spreads (e.g., Alexander, Kaeck 2008; Das 
et al. 2009; Ericsson et al. 2009; Forte, Peña 2009; Corò et al. 2013; Díaz et al. 2013). 
Credit default swaps are credit protection contracts in which one party receives periodic 
premiums in exchange for agreeing to make a contingent payment if a defined credit 
event occurs4. For buyers of credit protection, the CDS market offers an opportunity to 
reduce credit concentration and regulatory capital while maintaining customer relation-
ships. For sellers of protection, CDSs offer the opportunity to earn income for taking on 
credit exposure over a customized term without having to fund the position in question 
(Packer, Suthiphongchai 2003). 
As Das et al. (2009) note, CDSs provide a viable alternative for measuring credit risk 
for several reasons. First, CDS spreads offer cross-sectional and time-series credit qual-
ity information; as a result, studies of this continuous variable contrast with studies 
3 This assumption does not hold for Merton’s model, in which firms may have similar levels of equity 
and debt but very different likelihoods of default if the volatilities of their assets differ.
4 The regular payment made by the CDS buyer to the CDS seller is expressed as a percentage (nor-
mally in terms of basis points) of the contract’s notional value and is known as the CDS premium 
(or the CDS spread) (Ismailescu, Kazemi 2010).
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examining binary data samples of bankruptcies, which consider a company to be healthy 
until a default occurs. Second, CDS spreads reflect market perceptions of default rather 
than the perspective of a particular rating agency. Third, spreads capture both the default 
and the recovery risk aspects of firm distress. Finally, CDS spreads are less susceptible 
than corporate bond spreads to liquidity and tax effects (Elton et al. 2001). In addition, 
the ‘price’ of a CDS is normally quoted as a constant maturity spread, whereas bond 
spreads are calculated by subtracting an unknown risk-free interest rate from the bond 
yield and are therefore not directly comparable if the maturities of the underlying bonds 
differ (Alexander, Kaeck 2008).
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
this study is the first to investigate whether significant differences between accounting- 
and market-based approaches for measuring credit risk can be observed in the European 
market5. Given the benefits that have been identified in the literature, we have chosen to 
use CDS spreads as the best proxy for credit risk. Second, although most of the extant 
research stops at the onset of the recession, we consider an extended time span, from 
2002 to 2009, that includes both high-growth and economic crisis periods. The exten-
sion of the analysis to include the crisis period enables us to assess whether the findings 
reported in previous papers are robust to changes in the economic cycle. Finally, this 
paper evaluates the results that are obtained when credit ratings are used instead of CDS 
spreads as a measure for creditworthiness.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data and methodol-
ogy employed in the empirical research and defines the explanatory variables. Section 2 
presents and discusses the results obtained. The last section summarizes and concludes.
1. Data and methodological aspects
1.1. Sample
Our sample comprises firms listed on the FTSEuroFirst 100 Index with information 
about CDS spreads available in the Markit database during the period 2002–20096. 
Markit’s CDS data do not reflect any specific trading activity; instead, these data are 
post-trade valuation information drawn from numerous financial institutions, includ-
ing inter-dealer brokers, electronic trading platforms, major market makers and many 
significant buy-side firms. The data set undergoes a rigorous cleaning process in which 
stale, flat curves, outliers, and inconsistent data are discarded7.
As is customary, firms operating in the financial sector are excluded from the analysis of 
this study due to the different structure of their financial statements. Entities that present 
abnormal ratios or extreme values were also eliminated from the sample as outliers. 
5 One notable exception is Demirovic and Thomas (2007), who examine a sample of UK-listed com-
panies over the 1990–2002 time period.
6 The FTSEurofirst 100 Index includes the 60 companies with the greatest market capitalization in the 
FTSE Developed Europe Index and 40 additional European companies that are selected for their size 
and sector representation. Please see http://www.ftse.com for more details.
7 Please see http://www.markit.com for a detailed description of this database. 
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After the completion of this filtering process, the final sample consisted of 2,186 ob-
servations from 51 unique firms in six different European countries (France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom). Table 1 illustrates the number 
of observations that compose the sample, organized by year and by CDS maturity.
Table 1. Number of observations
CDS maturities
1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year 15-Year 30-Year All maturities
2002 28 28 28 28 28 25 12 177
2003 34 35 35 35 35 34 30 238
2004 38 39 39 39 39 38 38 270
2005 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 287
2006 42 42 43 43 43 43 43 299
2007 47 47 47 47 47 46 45 326
2008 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 322
2009 39 39 39 39 39 39 33 267
All years 315 317 318 318 318 312 288 2,186
In accordance with the procedures used by similar studies, we used unconsolidated 
statements, thus preventing relevant differences in the profit and loss statements and 
the balance sheets of parent companies and subsidiaries from negating each other. We 
obtained the accounting data from the Amadeus database, and market information was 
acquired from the Datastream database8.
1.2. Definition of variables
1.2.1. Dependent variable
As stated above, we use CDS spreads from the Markit database as the dependent vari-
able. Although there exists a high concentration of CDS quotes with 5-year maturities, 
which has led most studies dealing with corporate credit data to focus on this one spe-
cific maturity timeframe (e.g., Longstaff et al. 2005), this approach only examines the 
credit risk effects for one single point on the CDS term structure. Therefore, to provide 
more detailed insight, we include the whole maturity spectrum, which ranges from 1 
year to 30 years. We collect the CDS constant maturity spreads on a daily basis at the 
end of each year (averaged for the last 10 trading days) over the period 2002–2009. All 
of the examined contracts are senior unsecured obligations containing the modified-
modified restructuring clause, which is commonly used in Europe.
We regress the natural logarithm of CDS spreads on the explanatory variables. As 
Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) note, better fits are provided by regressions involving the 
logarithms of spreads than by direct regressions of the spreads.
8 Please see http://bvdinfo.com and http://online.thomsonreuters.com/datastream for detailed informa-
tion about Amadeus and Datastream, respectively.
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In Table 2, we present CDS spread values by maturity and year. CDS premiums vary 
significantly by maturity, ranging on average from 71 bps for 1-year CDS contracts to 
112 bps for 30-year CDS contracts. We also observe a downward trend in premiums 
from 2002 to 2006 for all maturities, and the average premium reaches a minimum of 
34 bps in 2006. In 2007, as a result of the onset of the financial crisis, there is a change 
in this trend. The worsening of the global credit crisis in 2008, which was led by, among 
other factors, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, dramatically increased the CDS spreads 
by an average of up to 298 bps. Although CDS premiums fell in 2009, they did not 
reach the levels that were observed prior to the start of the crisis.
Table 2. CDS spread descriptive statistics
CDS maturities
1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year 15-Year 30-Year All maturities
2002
Mean 71 75 81 88 99 110 126 89
St. Dev. 57 56 57 56 57 58 69 59
2003
Mean 43 55 62 66 76 81 52 62
St. Dev. 132 172 184 162 154 156 21 149
2004
Mean 15 22 30 45 66 70 74 46
St. Dev. 21 29 37 50 57 59 61 52
2005
Mean 12 19 27 43 68 73 76 45
St. Dev. 8 14 20 31 41 42 43 40
2006
Mean 7 12 17 29 51 59 63 34
St. Dev. 4 7 10 16 26 28 27 29
2007
Mean 26 33 40 51 67 74 92 54
St. Dev. 13 14 16 18 22 23 44 32
2008
Mean 323 328 319 299 274 271 274 298
St. Dev. 302 291 281 271 254 233 229 266
2009
Mean 42 56 68 87 103 104 113 81
St. Dev. 16 25 30 38 42 43 46 43
All 
years
Mean 71 79 84 91 103 108 112 92
St. Dev. 163 163 159 148 135 129 123 147
Note: CDS spreads are in basis points.
1.2.2. Accounting-based independent variables
We use 10 accounting variables to proxy for (1) liquidity, (2) capital structure, (3) debt 
service, (4) cash flow generation, (5) performance (profitability), and (6) firm size. All 
of these variables have been widely used by previous studies as drivers of credit risk, 
and most of these metrics are included in the two best-known accounting-based models 
of credit risk, namely, the Z-score (Altman 1968) and the O-score (Ohlson 1980).
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To proxy for financial liquidity, we use the ratio of current liabilities to current as-
sets (CL/CA) and the ratio of working capital to total assets (WC/TA). The former is 
constructed by dividing current liabilities by current assets. One would expect that a 
larger ratio would indicate lower liquidity; in fact, a company with a CL/CA ratio that 
exceeds unity may even experience problems in meeting its short-term obligations. We 
thus expect a positive relationship between the CL/CA ratio and the CDS premium. 
The working capital to total assets ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm 
relative to the firm’s total assets. Working capital is defined as the difference between 
current assets and current liabilities. In this case, we expect a negative relationship 
between the WC/TA ratio and the CDS premium.
We use the following two common ratios to analyze the effect of capital structure on 
the credit risk of companies: the ratio of retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA) and 
the debt-to-equity ratio (TL/Eq). Retained earnings refer to the account that reports the 
total amount of reinvested earnings and/or losses of a firm over its entire lifetime. The 
age of a firm is implicitly incorporated into this ratio; a relatively young firm will likely 
possess a low RE/TA ratio because it has not had time to build accumulated profit. The 
RE/TA ratio also measures the leverage of a firm. Firms with high RE, relative to TA, 
have largely financed their assets through the retention of profits and have not greatly 
utilized debt. The TL/Eq ratio, also referred to as the debt-to-equity ratio, is another 
leverage ratio that compares a company’s total liabilities with its total shareholders’ 
equity9. A higher percentage of liabilities and a greater potential earnings variability 
produce a greater potential for default. Consequently, we predict opposite values for the 
coefficients of these ratios in the regression analysis, i.e., we predict a negative coef-
ficient for the RE/TA ratio and a positive coefficient for the TL/Eq ratio.
Debt service is measured by the interest coverage ratio, i.e., earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) divided by total interest payments. This ratio is used to determine how 
easily a company can pay the interest on its outstanding debt. In accordance with the 
work of Blume et al. (1998), we transform the interest coverage ratio in two ways. First, 
we set any negative interest coverage ratios to zero. Second, any interest coverage ratio 
that exceeds 100 is censored on the assumption that further increases in value convey 
no additional information. A lower ratio indicates that a company is burdened by debt 
expense to a greater degree. If a company’s interest coverage ratio is 1.5 or lower, its 
ability to meet interest expenses may be questionable. We thus expect a negative rela-
tionship between the interest coverage ratio and the credit risk of firms. 
The earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total liabilities 
(EBITDA/TL) ratio measures a company’s ability to repay debt obligations from its 
annualized operating cash flow. This ratio is a common metric used by credit rating 
agencies to assess the probability of defaulting on issued debt. A low EBITDA/TL 
ratio suggests that a firm may not be able to service its debt in an appropriate manner 
9 We decide to use the debt-to-equity ratio instead of the debt ratio (total liabilities divided by total 
assets) to avoid potential issues involving collinearity with the RE/TA ratio.
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2014, 15(2): 253–276
260
and may result in a lowered credit rating. Conversely, a high ratio may suggest that a 
company may wish to consider taking on more debt and often implies that the firm in 
question warrants a relatively high credit rating. We hypothesize that a negative relation-
ship exists between the EBITDA/TL ratio and the CDS premium.
To measure operating performance, we use the asset turnover ratio, which is defined 
as the ratio between net sales and total assets. This ratio helps measure the effective-
ness with which the management uses its assets to generate sales or revenue (i.e., the 
productivity of a company’s assets). A high asset turnover ratio is desirable because it 
is indicative of better operating performance. A negative relationship between the asset 
turnover ratio and the firm’s credit risk is expected. If we use EBIT instead of net sales 
in the numerator of the ratio, we obtain a measure of profitability that is well known 
in the literature, namely, the return on total assets (ROA), which is considered to be an 
indicator of how effectively a company is using its assets to generate earnings before its 
contractual obligations must be paid. Moreover, in accordance with the customary prac-
tices of the literature (e.g., Arslan, Karan 2009), a third profitability ratio of net income 
divided by total assets (NI/TA) is also constructed. A negative relationship between all 
of these ratios and the CDS spreads is expected.
Finally, because the effect of size on firm’s credit risk appears to be non-linear, we use 
the logarithm of firm assets to accommodate the non-linear nature of this relationship. 
We expect that a company with a larger quantity of assets will have a lower CDS pre-
mium.
1.2.3. Market-based independent variables
As stated above, the theoretical inspiration for structural approach is Merton’s (1974) 
model. Merton (1974) considers the equity of a firm as a European-type call option on 
its assets, with the strike price being the accounting value of the outstanding debt due 
for repayment in the defined time horizon. Therefore, we can use the formulation of 
Black and Scholes (1973) to determine the probability that the company will default. 
According to the general assumptions of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, we can relate 
the market value of the firm’s equity at time 0, E0, with the market value of the assets, 
V0, and the volatility of the return on these assets, σV, using the following known ex-
pressions of the model:
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where N is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, r is the 
continuous-time risk-free interest rate, D is the book value of the debt with maturity T, 
and the remaining variables are as defined above.
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It can be observed that the model has two unknowns, V0 and σV. To estimate these 
parameters, we need an additional equation that relates the option’s volatility to the 











This equation, together with the previously provided equations that are denoted by (1), 
makes it possible to determine V0 and σV through the application of a numerical algo-
rithm that uses the values of E0 and σE; these variables are easy to calculate for listed 
companies. 
The risk-neutral probability that the value of the firm's assets will be less than the value 
of the debt on the date T, i.e., the probability that VT < D, is N(–d2). We can also cal-
culate the theoretical default probability by using µ, the expected rate of growth in the 
asset value. If this expected growth rate is known, the probability that we seek, at any 

















After the probability of default by a firm is estimated using equation (3), it is easy to 
quantify the distance-to-default (DtD) for the firm in question by applying the follow-



















Default occurs when the ratio of the value of assets to debt is less than 1, which implies 
that the logarithm of this ratio is negative. The preceding equation tells us the number 
of standard deviations that the logarithm of this ratio must deviate from its mean for 
default to occur. Because a company with a higher DtD has a lower probability of 
insolvency (and vice versa), we expect to observe a negative relationship between this 
variable and the CDS spread. DtD has been widely used in the literature as a market-
based variable for estimating credit risk (e.g., Demirovic, Thomas 2007; Das et al. 
2009). 
We make the following assumptions to obtain the DtD for a firm. E0 (the market value 
of equity) is considered to be the firm’s market capitalization during the month of De-
cember, whereas the input σE (the annualized standard deviation of equity returns) is 
estimated from the prior year of stock price returns10. We consider t = 0 and T = 1. In 
10 We also consider the annualized standard deviation of equity returns σE to be a specific independent 
variable. This approach allows for the effect of the equity market volatility in isolation to be as-
sessed. Higher equity volatility often implies higher asset volatility, which would cause firm values 
to be more likely to fall below the default threshold (Zhang et al. 2009).
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accordance with previous studies (e.g., Vassalou, Xing 2004; Du, Suo 2007), we assume 
that D, the amount of debt or the default point, is equal to the book value of the current 
liabilities plus half of the long-term debt. We use the 1-year constant maturity Treasury 
rate to represent r, the risk-free rate. Finally, µ has little discriminating power in the 
Merton model and it is proxied by the GDP growth rate for next year. 
In addition to the DtD, we consider other common market-based variables, such as the 
price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, which is a measure of the price paid for a share relative to 
the annual net income per share. This ratio is normally used for valuation: a higher P/E 
ratio indicates that investors are paying more for each unit of net income and therefore 
that the stock in question is more expensive than a stock with a lower P/E ratio. We 
expect a negative relationship between the P/E ratio and the firm’s credit risk. Similar 
reasoning applies to the price-to-cash flow (P/C) ratio. Finally, the price-to-book (P/B) 
ratio is the inverse of the known BM (book-to-market) ratio. Vassalou and Xing (2004) 
find that the BM ratio has a significant relationship with default risk; small firms with 
a high BM ratio tend to have a high default risk, whereas large firms with a low BM 
ratio are likely to have a low credit risk. Therefore, we predict a negative sign for the 
P/B ratio in our equation.
1.2.4. Control variables
To account for country- and industry-specific effects, we include country and industry 
dummy variables, respectively. The country dummy variables must capture differences 
in factors such as the institutional framework, the degree of competition, and the ac-
counting standards among the European countries. The industry dummies must control 
for differences among the industries that are considered (basic materials, consumer 
goods, consumer services, health care, industrials, oil and gas, utilities, and telecom-
munications). In addition, we include a set of year dummy variables to account for 
macroeconomic conditions and time-specific effects11.
Finally, we control for the maturity (in years) of the CDS contract. We hypothesize a 
positive relationship between the CDS maturity and the credit risk, i.e., contracts with 
longer maturities will tend to have higher CDS premiums. 
Table 3 summarizes the explanatory variables that are considered in the present study 
and their expected signs. 
11 Because we are only interested in knowing which firm-specific variables (accounting- or market-
based) are better determinants of credit risk, we chose to include year dummies to control for all 
macroeconomic variables. A detailed analysis of the macroeconomic determinants of credit risk is 
provided by Bonfim (2009), Tang and Yan (2010).
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Table 3. Explanatory variables and expected signs
Explanatory variables Notation Classification Expected signs
Accounting variables
Current liabilities/Current assets CL/CA Liquidity +
Working capital/Total assets WC/TA Liquidity –
Retained earnings/Total assets RE/TA Capital structure –
Total liabilities/Equity TL/Eq Capital structure +
Interest coverage ratio Coverage Debt service –
EBITDA/Total liabilities EBITDA/TL Cash flow generation –
Assets turnover ratio Turnover Performance (Profitability) –
Return on assets ROA Performance (Profitability) –
Net Income/Total assets NI/TA Performance (Profitability) –
Total assets, logarithm Size Size –
Market-based variables
Distance to default DtD Default risk –
Annualized equity volatility σE Market risk +
Price-to-earnings ratio P/E Market multiple –
Price-to-cash flow ratio P/C Market multiple –
Price-to-book ratio P/B Market multiple –
Control Variables
Maturity of CDS contract 
(1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 30 years)
Maturity Contract-specific variable +
Industry, country, and year dummies Control variables
1.3. Methodology
Following the same procedure that was used by Das et al. (2009) to examine the US 
market, we estimate and compare the explanatory power of the following three multi-
variate empirical models for the European market: (1) an accounting-based multivariate 
model of the determinants of credit spreads, (2) a model that uses market information, 
and (3) a comprehensive model that includes both accounting- and market-based data.
1.3.1. Accounting-based model (Model 1)
We estimate the following linear regression: 
Yi,t = α + b1 · CL/CAi,t + b2 · WC/TAi,t + b3 · RE/TAi,t + b4 · TL/Eqi,t + 
b5 · Coveragei,t + b6 · EBITDA/TLi,t + b7 · Turnoveri,t + b8 · ROAi,t + b9 · NI/TAi,t + 
b10 · Sizei,t + b11 · Maturityi,t + δ · Industry dummiesi + γ · Country dummiesi +  
θ · Year dummiest + εi,t .                                                                                 (5)
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For this regression, the subscripts i and t index firms and years, respectively, whereas 
Y denotes the dependent variable, which is the natural logarithm of the CDS spread at 
the end of the year. As stated above, we consider 10 firm-specific accounting variables 
and several additional dummy variables to account for the industry, the country, and the 
macroeconomic environment. Finally, we control for the maturity of the CDS contract. 
The notations of these explanatory variables are described in Table 3. In the regression 
above, εi,t is the disturbance term. 
1.3.2. Market-based model (Model 2)
We now estimate the following linear regression: 
Yi,t = α + b1 · DtDi,t + b2 · σEi,t + b3 · P/Ei,t + b4 · P/Ci,t + b5 · P/Bi,t +  
b6 · Maturityi,t + δ · Industry dummiesi + γ · Country dummiesi +  
θ · Year dummiest + εi,t .                                                                   (6)
Again, for this regression, the subscripts i and t index firms and time periods, respec-
tively, whereas Y denotes the dependent variable, which is the natural logarithm of the 
CDS spread at the end of the year. We consider 5 firm-specific market-based variables 
and several dummy variables to account for the industry, the country, and the macro-
economic environment. We also control for the maturity of the CDS contract. The nota-
tions of these explanatory variables are described in Table 3. εi,t is the disturbance term.
1.3.3. Comprehensive model (Model 3)
Finally, our third model attempts to determine whether market-based measures add any 
value if they are used in combination with accounting measures. Therefore, the linear 
regression for this model is as follows:
Yi,t = α + b1 · CL/CAi,t + b2 · WC/TAi,t + b3 · RE/TAi,t + b4 · TL/Eqi,t + 
b5 · Coveragei,t + b6 · EBITDA/TLi,t + b7 · Turnoveri,t + b8 · ROAi,t +  
b9 · NI/TAi,t + b10 · Sizei,t + b11 · DtDi,t + b12 · σEi,t + b13 · P/Ei,t + 
b14 · P/Ci,t + b15 · P/Bi,t + b16 · Maturityi,t + δ · Industry dummiesi +  
γ · Country dummiesi + θ · Year dummiest + εi,t .                                      (7)
In this regression, Y once again denotes the dependent variable, which is the natural 
logarithm of the CDS spread for firm i at the end of year t. Model 3 considers firm-
specific accounting- and market-based variables as well as additional variables to ac-
count for the industry, the country, the macroeconomic environment, and the maturity 
of the CDS contract. 
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2. Results
2.1. Comparative analysis of credit risk models
Table 4 reports our results for the three credit risk models that are considered12. 
























































12 First, however, we perform an analysis of multicollinearity for the previously selected independent 
variables. A study of the matrix of correlations indicates that most of the coefficients of bivariate 
correlation are lower than 0.65. We subsequently confirm that collinearity would not be a problem 
by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF); this factor reaches a value that is close to 1 for 
most of the variables. 

















dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country 
dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Clustering level Firm Firm Firm
N 2,186 2,186 2,186
R2 67.42% 68.41% 72.76%
Adjusted R2 66.97% 68.04% 72.32%
Notes: This table reports linear regressions of the logarithm of CDS spreads to accounting measures 
(Model 1), market-based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3). See Table 3 for a description of 
the variables. Robust standard errors, which are clustered by firms, are reported in parentheses. Sig-
nificance levels are indicated as follows: *** – significant at the 1% level, ** – significant at the 5% 
level, and * – significant at the 10% level.
In the accounting-based equation (Model 1), we find that all of the variables that were 
considered have the expected sign. The WC/TA ratio demonstrates a negative and sta-
tistically significant relationship with CDS spreads, meaning that lower liquidity im-
plies higher credit risk. In past studies (e.g., Altman 1968), this ratio has also been 
found to be a significant indicator of corporate problems. 
The two variables that measure the effect of capital structure on credit risk (RE/TA and 
TL/Eq ratios) evince strong relationships with CDS spreads. Firms with higher retained 
earnings relative to total assets are expected to have lower credit risk levels due to their 
older age and lower leverage. However, a higher value of TL/Eq implies greater lever-
age and thus a higher probability of default. Recently, Jakubík and Teplý (2011) assess 
a sample of Czech firms for the period 1993–2005 and conclude that the TL/Eq ratio, 
along with the WC/TA ratio and the interest coverage ratio, are the most important 
indicators of business failure.
We demonstrate a strong negative relationship between the interest coverage ratio and 
CDS spreads. Therefore, the CDS premium declines as the firm’s EBIT relative to its 
total interest payments increases. Nevertheless, we do not find the EBITDA/TL ratio to 
be a statistically significant driver of credit risk. 
As expected, the regression coefficients indicate a negative relationship between profit-
ability measures and corporate credit risk, although only the coefficient of the NI/TA 
ratio is statistically significant (at the 5% level). Finally, we do not find size to be a 
determinant of CDS spreads. However, because the sample is composed of large Euro-
End of Table 4
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pean companies that are similar in size (the coefficient of variation for the size variable 
is only 25%), a degree of caution should be exercised in interpreting this outcome.
Similarly to the results obtained by Das et al. (2009), the explanatory power of our 
accounting-based model is high, as this model accounts for 67% of the variation of 
CDS spreads.
In Model 2 (the market-based model), we find that both distance-to-default and the 
annualized standard deviation of equity returns are statistically significant (at the 1% 
level), and the signs of the coefficients for these variables are as predicted. In particular, 
a higher value of DtD and a lower equity volatility imply lower credit risk. The P/E, 
P/C, and P/B ratios produce no significant association with the CDS spreads. However, 
the coefficient sign of the P/E ratio disagrees with our predictions. As Wang et al. 
(2011) note, the P/E ratio may have two opposite effects on CDS spreads: a high P/E 
ratio implies high future asset growth, reducing the likelihood of financial distress, but 
high-growth firms tend to have high return volatilities, which increase credit risk. The 
explanatory power of this second model is slightly higher than the accounting-based 
model, with an adjusted R2 value of 68% for Model 2 versus 67% for Model 1. 
Model 3 includes both accounting- and market-based variables for explaining credit 
risk. Most of the explanatory variables retain the same signs and statistical significances 
as were observed in Models 1 and 2. However, the WC/TA and the NI/TA ratio lose 
statistical significance relative to the results of the previous models, whereas the P/E 
ratio and the P/B ratio become statistically significant in Model 3 (at the 10% and 1% 
level, respectively).
The adjusted R2 improves from 67% (Model 1) and 68% (Model 2) to 72%, suggesting 
that accounting- and market-based data are complementary. This finding is in accord-
ance with the results of Agarwall and Taffler (2008) and Das et al. (2009) for the UK 
and the US markets, respectively.
2.2. Robustness checks
To further confirm the aforementioned findings, we conduct a number of robustness 
checks. First, we split the sample into two periods: a pre-crisis period (from 2002 to 
2006) and a crisis period (from 2007 to 2009). Through this process, we investigate the 
possible impact of the recent financial crisis on our credit risk models. Although our 
broad results do not change (see Table 5) in that a comprehensive model using both 
types of variables remains the best option for measuring credit risk, we do observe 
certain differences between the two periods (before the crisis and during the crisis) 
with respect to the explanatory power of the models and the statistical significance of 
certain explanatory variables. In particular, we find that the explanatory power of the 
examined models is considerably higher during the crisis period than it was before the 
crisis period. We also observe that liquidity ratios appear to play an important role as 
determinants of default risk during periods of crisis. A similar phenomenon is observed 
for the P/C ratio. In times of crisis, investors appear to positively value greater liquid-
ity and reduce the premiums paid for eventual default among companies with better 
liquidity ratios. 
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Second, we perform a robustness check to analyze the effect of the maturity of the CDS 
contract on our results13. We consider only 1-, 5-, and 30-year CDS spread data. Our 
main finding remains unchanged; that is, the comprehensive model provides the great-
est explanatory power for all of the maturities that are considered.
Finally, we evaluate the method of estimation that is used in the analysis. Because panel 
data are used, we can re-estimate the models with either fixed or random effects. Haus-
man tests suggest that the fixed effects estimator is more appropriate in our case14. We 
now assume that the omitted variables (e.g., CDS liquidity and corporate governance, 
among others) may potentially correlate with the existing regressors. As expected, the 
comprehensive model has the greatest explanatory power.
2.3. Are there differences if credit ratings are used instead of CDS spreads?
Credit ratings have also been used as a typical proxy for credit risk in the literature (e.g., 
Demirovic, Thomas 2007). Because these credit ratings are inherently ordered, we use 
an ordered logistic regression for modeling the relationship between the credit risk and 
both the accounting and the market-based data. We use discrete values of credit rat-
ings as a dependent variable, i.e., we convert the ratings provided by the agencies into 
numerical groupings that range from 1 for the best ratings to 7 for ratings of BBB- or 
lower. Table 6 reports the credit rating provided by the three major international rating 
agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) for the firms of the sample over the 
2002–2009 period as well as the assigned numerical values. Each company is assigned 
the rating it has at the end of the year. If the company is rated by more than one of 
the agencies in a single year, each rating is considered to be a separate observation. In 
total, we have 706 observations for 51 unique firms that are listed in the FTSEurofirst 
100 index.
Our results from this analysis (see Table 7) are very similar to the results that were 
obtained by considering the CDS spread to be a proxy for credit risk. Again, a compre-
hensive model that includes both accounting and market data has the greatest explana-
tory power (23%). However, our outcomes indicate that when the credit rating is used 
as the credit risk measure, accounting data play a more important role than market data 
in explaining a firm´s creditworthiness (the accounting-based model explains 21% of 
the variability, whereas the market-based model explains only 14% of the variability). 
The same conclusion is reached by Demirovic and Thomas (2007) for the UK market. 
Finally, although most of the explanatory variables remain unaffected with respect to 
their signs and their levels of significance, we observe that liquidity ratios now appear 
to be more important drivers of default risk and that equity volatility loses much of its 
explanatory power. We also find that the variable that measures the effect of size on 
credit risk is positive and strongly statistically significant, suggesting that greater firm 
size is associated with a higher credit rating. 
13 We do not report these values due to space limitations. However, they are available upon request.
14 We use only the most liquid 5-year CDS contracts to generate these results (not reported).
A. Trujillo-Ponce et al. Examining what best explains corporate credit risk ...
271
Table 6. Credit rating conversion
Rating
Standard & Poor´s Moody´s Fitch Assigned value
No. of 
observations Percentage
AAA Aaa AAA 1
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 1
AA Aa2 AA 1
AA– Aa3 AA– 1 66 9.35%
A+ A1 A+ 2 109 15.44%
A A2 A 3 62 8.78%
A– A3 A– 4 152 21.53%
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 5 224 31.73%
BBB Baa2 BBB 6 72 10.20%
BBB- or lower Baa3 or lower BBB- or lower 7 21 2.97%
706 100.00%
Note: Rating data were obtained from Bloomberg.































































dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country 
dummies Yes Yes Yes
Agency dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 706 706 706
Pseudo R2 20.58% 14.45% 22.82%
Note: This table reports ordered logistic regressions of the long-term credit ratings provided by the 
three major international rating agencies (Standard & Poor´s, Moody´s and Fitch) to accounting meas-
ures (Model 1), market-based measures (Model 2) and both (Model 3). See Table 6 for the numerical 
values assigned to the credit ratings. See Table 3 for a description of the independent variables. Stand-
ard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** – significant at 
the 1% level, ** – significant at the 5% level, and * – significant at the 10% level.
Conclusions 
Using a sample of 2,186 credit default swap (CDS) spreads taken from the European 
market during the period 2002–2009, this paper empirically analyzes which model – 
accounting- or market-based – better explains corporate credit risk.
We find little difference in the explanatory power of these two approaches. Our results 
indicate that a comprehensive model that combines accounting- and market-based vari-
ables is the best option to explain the credit risk, suggesting that both types of data are 
complementary. This finding is in accordance with the results reported by Agarwall 
and Taffler (2008) and Das et al. (2009) for the UK and the US markets, respectively.
We also demonstrate that the explanatory power of accounting- and market-based vari-
ables for measuring credit risk is particularly strong during periods of high uncertainty. 
It may occur because CDS spreads become more sensitive during periods of crisis and 
therefore act as better credit risk indicators.
Finally, when the credit rating is used as a proxy for credit risk, our main conclusion 
is unchanged, i.e., the best results are obtained through the use of a combination of ac-
counting- and market-based data. However, our results suggest that accounting variables 
play a more important role than market variables in determining credit ratings.
End of Table 7
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